The current global crisis of democracy also extends to Latin America, where half of the countries display signs of democratic erosion. In this context, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated many of the previously existing historical problems and has highlighted the necessity of undertaking profound structural reforms that allow the governance of the already fragile regional democracies to be strengthened.
In the aftermath of the pandemic, the democracies of Latin America, which had already come into this new decade fatigued, as seen in Central America and the Caribbean with El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti; and in South America with Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia, have emerged even weaker. Since the first case of COVID-19 was reported in Latin America in February 2020, the region has not only experienced major shifts in its institutional and political dynamics but has also seen further deepening of the structural problems already affecting regional democracies, all of which exhibit worrying new symptoms of weakness.
Latin America and the Caribbean has been the most vulnerable region to the pandemic. As a consequence of the prolonged health and social crisis, poverty across the region has hit historic highs and has had a strong negative impact on inequality and employment. But the pandemic has also served as a pretext for some rulers, such as in Brazil and El Salvador, to monopolise more power and misuse the state of emergency, which is constitutionally provided for special situations and provides for the adoption of exceptional measures. As a result, COVID-19 brought about an accelerated political and institutional deterioration as well as an increase in public distrust of both politicians and institutions.
The pandemic has made more evident the weaknesses of Latin American governments, which have been traditionally ineffective in the implementation of public policies, to deal with the health crisis, and has led to greater levels of discontent towards democratic institutions. Latin American societies, after the economic boom, were already showing clear signs of democratic disaffection, derived from the ineffectiveness of Latin American democracies in channelling social demands and finding solutions to the growing social frustration. In addition, a large number of people experienced the measures taken by Latin American governments, including confinement measures and greater presence of military and security forces on the streets, as nothing more than an imposition of authoritarianism on individual rights. The distrust in the state, typical of Latin American political culture, has led to this disaffection, which in some cases has turned into open rejection of the system.
The political area in which the pandemic’s impact on democracy was most noticeable was in the electoral field, regarding the celebration of elections and their participation, as well as the conduct of campaigns and voting procedures. Other political problems also damaging the institution of democracy include several scandals, in countries such as Peru and Argentina, involving the early vaccination of political leaders and their friends and family members regardless of the established schedules and requirements, thus deepening the distance between political elites and citizens. This phenomenon, which more and more defines the political life of the region, splits societies into two or more different sides, each of which presents its particular vision of the country, different and often incompatible with that of the others, making it impossible to reach a minimum political consensus. In short, polarisation deteriorates coexistence and hinders good governance.
The weakness of Latin American states has favoured the emergence of personalist leaderships, in which the new caudillos deliver an anti-elite rather than an anti-system message. In the context of the pandemic, a fourth populist wave has emerged in the region, “COVID-populism”. The “COVID-populists”, who all displayed some denialist disdain for the pandemic, tend to be personalistic movement leaders, as with Bolsonaro (Brazil) and López Obrador (Mexico), with a polarising and populist message, which opposes the political and party system. Moreover, without solid political cadres and no structured agenda, they often lean on fringe political parties, such as Bolsonaro in the PSL.
The new populism relies on nationalist messages and actions, and appeals to sentiment to garner support. Relying on their charisma and simple messages to better reach all sectors of society, these populists exploit resentment and social frustration to channel discontent with politics and politicians. They also seek to overthrow institutional structures, restraining the control capacity of other counter-powers, in particular that of the judiciary and the legislature, without which it is impossible to stop the concentration of power, and power remains in the hands of political leaders with no interest in democracy. Throughout Latin America, COVID-19 has fostered a dangerous tendency to support such populist solutions.
In short, the pandemic has worsened Latin America’s historical social, economic, and political difficulties and intensified the deterioration of the democracies in the region. The lack of effectiveness of governments to respond to the demands of citizens, of more and more discontented, polarized and fragmented societies, and to the health and economic-social challenge derived from COVID-19, has led to the appearance of new populisms and personalist authoritarian leaderships, and in general to the growth in the fragility of Latin American democratic systems.
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